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LABOR LAW-Prima Facie Tort Doctrine Bars Unreasonable
Deprivation of Union Membership-Hurwitz v. Directors
Guild of A.merica, Inc.*
In July 1965 the officers of the Directors Guild of America (DGA)
and the Screen Directors International Guild (SDIG) concluded a
merger agreement which provided that DGA was to be the surviving
union and SDIG members were to become members of DGA automatically upon signing the DGA non-Communist loyalty oath. 1 Although the SDIG membership ratified the merger agreement by a
majority vote,2 six members steadfastly refused to sign the oath and
as a result were not admitted to membership in DGA. They thereupon brought a diversity suit in a New York federal district court:3
and moved for a preliminary injunction ordering DGA to admit
them without requiring them to sign the oath. The court denied the
motion. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, held, reversed. Deprivation4 of union membership
inevitably causes economic injury, and therefore constitutes a prima
facie tort. Although prevention of subversive infiltration may justify
• !164 F,2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 385 U.S. 971 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as
principal case].
I. This oath was identical to the now repealed § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations
Act, ch. 120, § 9(h), 61 Stat. 146 (1947). It read as follows:
I am not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and I
do not believe in, and I am not a member of nor do I support any organization
that believes in or teaches the overthrow of the United States government by force
or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods.
2, The tally was 4!19 to 63 in favor of merger.
3. Plaintiffs alleged both diversity and federal question jurisdiction. The latter claim
was dropped on appeal, however, when it was admitted that DGA was a union of supervisors and thus not subject to the provisions of the NLRA. Reply Brief for Appellants,
p. 3 n.2, principal case.
4. The court ruled that although plaintiffs had never been members of DGA, they
did have contract and property rights to DGA membership sufficient to warrant
treating them "as though • • • [they] had been expelled • • • ." Principal case at 72.
Nonetheless, the court also stated in dictum that it saw "no sound reason why recovery
should not be granted for wrongful exclusion as well ••• ," Id. at 72 n.7.
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the infliction of such injury, the DGA oath was unreasonably vague
and thus an impermissible means of accomplishing this objective. 5
The decision in the principal case is grounded on the theory that
"prima facie, the intentional infliction of temporal damage is a
cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive law ... requires a
justification if the defendant is to escape." 6 The burden of proof
is thus placed on the defendant to show that his conduct was "justified." While the prima fade tort theory is fairly well established in
Anglo-American law,7 its use has traditionally remained confined to
the original fields of its application: unfair competition8 and labormanagement relations. 9 Apparently, prior to the principal case, no
American court had ever applied the doctrine in actions involving
either wrongful expulsion or wrongful exclusion from union membership.10 Other theories of liability are available to members who
5. Id. at 75.
6. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904) (Holmes, J.).
7. Though apparently medieval in its origins [see Forkosch, An Analysis of the Prima
Facie Tort Cause of Action, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 465-75 (1957)], the prima facie tort theory
received its first modern statement in Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow &: Co.
[1891] 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613 (Lord Bowen), aff'd [1893] 17 A.C. 25. In Skinner &: Co. v.
Shew &: Co., [1893] 1 Ch. 413, 422, the same judge said: "At Common Law there was a
cause of action whenever one person did damage to another, wilfully and intentionally,
and without just cause or excuse." Holmes introduced the doctrine in America in
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896) (dissenting opinion),
and the United States Supreme Court accepted it in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194,
204 (1904). Sir Frederick Pollock also appears to have approved of the doctrine. POLLOCK,
TORTS 17-18 (15th ed. 1951). For a list of eighteen states in which the theory has been
accepted, see Note, 52 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 503, 504 n.13 (1952).
8. See, e.g., Boggs v. Duncan-Schell Furniture Co., 163 Iowa 106, 143 N.W. 482 (1913);
Memphis Steam Laundry-Cleaners, Inc. v. Lindsey, 192 Miss. 224, 5 So. 2d 277 (1941);
Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 83-84, 70 N.E.2d 401, 402-03
(1946).
9. See, e.g., American Guild of Musical Artists v. Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, 231, 36
N.E.2d 123, 125 (1941); Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 355, 34 N.E.2d 349,
352, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 615 (1951); Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E.2d 12 (1947).
See generally Forkosch, The Doctrine of Just Cause as Applied to Labor Cases, 23
TEMPLE L.Q. 178 (1950), repr. 1 LAB. L.J. 789 (1950) where it is argued that the prima
facie tort theory was the true basis upon which all the great pre-NLRA labormanagement relations cases were founded.
10. In New York, the state in which nearly half of the cases involving union expulsions and exclusions have been decided [see Summers, The Law of Union Discipline:
What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 177 (1960)], the tendency has been to restrict rather than to expand the application of the prima facie tort doctrine. In Reinforce,
Inc. v. Birney, 308 N.Y. 164, 124 N.E.2d 104 (1954), for example, the Court of Appeals
took the position that in order for the doctrine to apply, the defendant must have been
motivated solely by actual malice. [For criticism of the New York approach, see Brown,
The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Principle, 54 Nw. U.L. REv.
563, 567-74 (1959); Forkosch, An Analysis of the Prima Facie Tort Cause of Action,
42 COl!NELL L.Q. 465, 477-81 (1957); Note, 52 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 503, 507-08 (1952).] Three
cases, however, suggest that the prima facie tort doctrine may be applied in expulsion
situations: Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (woman's rights party
ordered to reinstate group expelled because of their opposition to party leadership);
Barile v. Fischer, 197 Misc. 493, 94 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (union held liable in
tort for blacklisting an expelled member who had refused to pay his dues in protest
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are arbitrarily expelled from labor organizations; 11 thus, arguably,
the prima fade tort theory will give little or no added protection to
such members. Indeed, since the Second Circuit treated the principal
case as involving expulsion, it might have been able to reach the
same result without resort to prima fade tort. However, the court did
apply that theory and in dictum went on to add that there was no
reason why the doctrine should not be equally applicable when a
worker has been unreasonably excluded from union membership. 12
It is submitted that in exclusion cases the prima fade tort theory will
provide a necessary and appropriate means for remedying union
abuses.
Despite the tremendous growth in the power and influence of
unions in American industrial sodety, 13 courts have consistently
refused to distinguish labor organizations from other nonprofit, voluntary associations. 14 Since the basic judicial policy with respect to
the admissions practices of such groups has traditionally been one
of noninterference, no special cause of action has been developed for
the arbitrarily excluded member. 15 Furthermore, conceptual difficulties have prevented courts from applying to the exclusion situation the same rationales used to protect workers in expulsion cases.
Courts have resorted to two distinct theories in granting relief
against the union officers' failure to comply with § 9(h) of the NLRA); Orchard v.
Tunney, [1955] West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 49, [1955] 3 D.L.R. 15 (Man. Ct. App.) (member's
expulsion from union held prima facie tortious; but on appeal this theory was rejected
by the Canadian Supreme Court, which held that the case could properly be dealt with
only under a contract theory. [1957] Can. Sup. Ct. 436, [1957] 8 D.L.R.2d 273).
11. See text accompanying notes 16-20 infra.
12. Sec note 4 supra.
13. Sec Summers, The Right To Join a Union, 47 CoLUM. L. REV. 33, 39-44 (1947) for
an excellent short discussion of the development of labor unions from weak, impotent
groups into powerful economic organizations.
14. Thus, the general principles that originally were developed to govern the internal
affairs of social clubs, churches, and fraternal lodges have also been applied to unions.
Id. at 37-38. For example, the same rules employed in union expulsion situations have
also been applied to cases involving expulsions from fraternal insurance associations
[Wilcox v. Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum, 210 N.Y. 370, 104 N.E. 624 (1914)],
the New York Stock Exchange [Cohen v. Thomas, 209 N.Y. 407, 103 N.E. 708 (1913)], and
the New York Produce Exchange [People ex rel. Johnson v. New York Produce Exch.,
149 N.Y. 401, 44 N.E. 84 (1896)]. For an eloquent criticism of this general policy, see
Chafce, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REv. 993 (1930).
15. The leading cases exemplifying the traditional position are: Walter v. McCarvel,
309 Mass. 260, 34 N.E.2d 677 (1941); Mayer v. Journeymen Stonecutters Ass'n, 47 N.J.
Eq. 519, 20 Atl. 492 (Ch. 1890); Miller v. Reuhl, 166 Misc. 479, 2 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup.
Ct. 1938). In the Mayer case, supra, immigrant laborers were prevented from pursuing
their trade by a combination of union exclusion and closed-shop agreements between
the union and all the employers in the area. The Vice Chancellor denied the workers
relief, arguing as follows:
[T]he [union] ... has clear right •.. to prescribe qualifications for membership;
it may make it as exclusive as it sees fit; it may make the restriction on the line of
citizenship, nationality, age, creed, or . . • profession, as well as numbers. This
power is incident to its cl1aracter as a voluntary association •••.
Id. at 525, 20 Atl. at 494.
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to union members who have been arbitrarily expelled. First, the
union member has been regarded as having a vested property right
in the assets and benefit programs of the organization to which he
belongs. 16 On this basis, courts have held that his expulsion, if not
justified by the union's constitution or by-laws, constitutes an illegal
deprivation of property. 17 Second, the act of joining a union has
been said to create a contract between the individual and the organization, the terms of which are represented by the provisions of the
union's constitution and by-laws.18 Thus, if a member has been
expelled on grounds not provided for in those documents, he has
a cause of action for breach of contract.19 The resort to contract
theory, of course, implies that the traditional defenses of contract
law will be available to both the employee and the union. Thus, in
rare instances, courts have afforded relief to union members who
have been expelled in accordance with the rules of the constitution
or by-laws on the ground that the rule in question was void as against
public policy or contrary to natural justice.20 Although there is considerable doubt that the property and contract theories accurately
reflect the worker's actual interests in union membership,21 it appears
16. See, e.g., Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931); Angrisani v. Stearn,
167 Misc. 728, 3 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct.), affd mem. 255 App. Div. 975, 8 N.Y.S.2d 997
(1938); see Chafee, supra note 14, at 999; Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union
Democracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 609, 613 (1959); Summers, Legal Limitations on Union
Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049, 1051-52 (1951).
17. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915): Bogni v. Periotti, 224 Mass. 152, 112
N.E. 853 (1916); Angrisani v. Stearn, supra note 16. In the Angrisani case a union was
directed to reinstate a member who had been expelled for bringing suit against the
union's officers. The court held that the member's conduct did not violate a union
by-law that prohibited the carrying on of union business outside union meetings or the
union's executive board rooms.
18. Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 37 Cal. 2d 134, 231 P.2d 6 (1951); Polin v.
Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931); see Chafee, supra note 14, at 1001; Cox, supra
note 16, at 613; Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049,
1054 (1951).
19. Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, supra note 18; see Chafee, supra note 14, at
1001; Cox, supra note 16, at 613, Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,
64 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1049, 1051 (1951).
20. See, e.g., Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge No. 665, Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 270 Pa.
67,113 Atl. 70 (1921), where the court voided the expulsion of a union member who had
violated a union regulation prohibiting members from using their influence to defeat
any federal or state legislation. In ordering reinstatement the court said:
[T]he by-laws, rules, and regulations of [corporations and unincorporated asso•
ciations] .•• will be enforced only when they are reasonable [citing cases]; and
they never can be adjudged reasonable when, as here, they would compel the
citizen to lose his property rights in accumulated assets, or forego the exercise of
other rights which are constitutionally inviolable.
Id. at 70.
21. An employee's only true property interest in union membership lies in the benefit
programs provided by the labor organization, for if a union member has any property
right in his union's assets, it certainly bears little resemblance to traditional forms of
ownership. A member cannot transfer or devise his rights; moreover, if the local to
which he belongs should be dissolved, its assets will pass to the international rather
than being divided among the local members. Indeed, even if the assets were divided,
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that they provide reasonably adequate protection against arbitrary
expulsions. However, the conceptualization of theories of recovery in
terms of property and contract rights prevents these theories from
also being applied to provide remedies for unreasonable exclusions,
since an excluded applicant for membership, not having a vested
interest in union assets or benefit programs and not having engaged
in the act of joining the organization, can assert neither property nor
contract claims against the union. Thus, it has been asserted that the
common law provides no basis £or preventing labor organizations
from refusing a worker's application for membership "for any reason
or for no reason.'' 22
Until very recently, Congress had also made no attempt to regulate union admission policies. Section S(b)(l)(A) of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 23 specifically places the regulation of
union membership policies beyond the purview of the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB). To be sure, section 8(b)(2) of the
NLRA24 prohibits unions from causing an employer to discriminate
against a worker who has been denied union membership for reasons
other than his failure to tender dues and initiation fees. 25 However,
the share of any individual member would be minimal: a statistical study of thirty-two
of the largest and wealthiest unions reveals that if the assets of these organizations were
divided among their respective memberships, each member would only receive approximately $22. Life, May 31, 1948, pp. 80-81. Thus the interest of a union member in the
assets of his union clearly is not an accurate measure of the economic and social harm
which he suffers when expelled. In practice the courts appear to have recognized this
and consequently do not limit relief to actual damages but invariably order total
reinstatement. See, e.g., Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 853 (1931).
The contract theory is even more unsatisfactory. Few ordinary contracts would be
enforced if phrased in terms as vague as those found in most union constitutions and
by-laws. There is also a serious question whether the requisite mutuality of obligation
exists, since the union is generally free to change its regulations by majority vote over
the objections of any individual member. Finally, it is totally unrealistic to treat the
act of joining a union as a "bargain" between two equally free "contracting" parties:
"The man is supposed to have contracted to give •.• [the union] these great powers;
but in practice he has no choice in the matter. If he is to engage in the trade, he has to
submit to the rules promulgated by the [union's executive] committee .•••" Lee v.
Showmen's Guild, (1952) 1 All E.R. 1175, 1181 (C.A.) (Lord Justice Denning).
22. Summers, The Right To Join a Union, 47 CoLUM. L. REv. 33, 38 (1947); see note
15 supra and accompanying text.
23. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1964):
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ••• to
restrain •• , employees in the exercise of the rights •.• guaranteed in section 7:
Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization
to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein ••••
24, 61 Stat, 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964):
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ••• to
cause ••• an employer to discriminate against an employee •.• to whom membership
in such or!f!tnization has been denied or terminated on some ground other
than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly
required as a condition for acquiring or retaining membership ••••
25. Thus, in Hoisting &: Portable Eng'rs, Local 4, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,

1678

.Michzgan Law Review

[Vol. 65

while this prov1S1on assures an employee the right to obtain or
retain a job without arbitrary union interference, it does not force
the union to accept him into membership even when a "union shop"
agreement is in effect. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) 26 significantly limited the right of
labor organizations arbitrarily to discipline their members; 21 however, attempts to extend protection to applicants for union membership were expressly rejected. 28
In 1964 Congress did substantially restrict the right of labor
unions to exclude workers from membership. Section 703(c) of the
Civil Rights Act29 prohibits a labor organization from discriminating
in any way on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Any person claiming to be aggrieved under this provision may file
a ·written charge with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission,80 which will attempt to resolve the dispute through informal
141 N.L.R.B. 1231 (1963), the Board held that the union had violated § 8(b)(2) when it
caused an employer to discharge a worker because he was known as a "wage cutter" and,
therefore, was not acceptable to the union's membership.
26. 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964).
27. The act purports to create a "Bill of Rights" for union members. 73 Stat. 522
(1959), 29 u.s.c. §§ 411-15 (1964).
28.• While the LMRDA was still in House committee, Representative Powell of New
York proposed an amendment providing that "no labor organization shall discriminate
unfairly in its representation of all employees in the negotiation and administration of
collective bargaining agreements, or refuse membership, segregate or expel any person
on the grounds of race, religion, color, sex, or national origin." (Emphasis added.)
However, the bill's two sponsors opposed adoption of the amendment.
Mr. Landrum:
·we do not seek in this legislation, in no way, no shape, no guise, to tell the labor
unions of this country whom they shall admit to their unions. No part of this
legislation attempts to do that..•. The law is designed only to say that, if [a man]
... is a member of a union, he shall have equal rights.•.. Vve do not here seek
to withdraw or take away from the unions the right to fix their own rules for the
acquisition or retention of membership. . . .
Mr. Griffin:
Everybody knows why this particular amendment was offered at this time-to kill
the legislation. The labor reform legislation before the House . . . does not
touch or deal in any way with the admission to, or retention of, membership in a
union.
The record of the entire debate appears in !I LEGISLATIVE HISIORY OF THE LABOR•
MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE Acr OF 1959 1648-51 (1959).
29. 78 Stat. 255-56, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1964):
It shall be unlawful employment practice for a labor organization(!) to exclude or expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin;
·
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail or refuse
to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.
30. 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964).
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procedures.31 Should these procedures fail, the complainant is then
permitted to bring a civil suit in federal district court.32
Although in theory the Civil Rights Act should provide a remedy
for the most common33 types of arbitrary exclusion from union
membership, procedural barriers in the act may prevent it from
being fully effective. 34 Moreover, while the coverage of the act is
broad, it is not all-inclusive. The Commerce Clause is an absolute
limit on its applicability. 35 In addition, there are a number of types
of discrimination to which its protection does not even purport to
extend. Exclusion on the grounds of unorthodox political beliefs is
in no way proscribed. The act does not prohibit unions from making
the signing of a non-Communist affidavit a prerequisite for membership. Nor does it forbid unions to expel or exclude workers because
they favor "right-to-work" laws or political candidates not approved
by the union leadership. Another basis for discrimination that remains legally acceptable is nepotism, a practice quite prevalent in
the building trades unions. 36 Many of these organizations for years
have restricted membership on a racial basis; 37 thus, the effect of
allowing "family unions" to continue is to permit the virtual total
exclusion of nonwhite groups from the skilled craft unions.
In light of the tremendous economic and social importance which
31. The act requires the Commission first to try to eliminate the alleged unlawful
practice by conference, conciliation, and persuasion. 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)
(1964).
32. 78 Stat. 260-61, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e) & (f) (1964). Upon application of the
complainant, it is within the discretion of the court to appoint an attorney to conduct
the litigation without payment of fees. 78 Stat. 260, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964). The
court may also permit the Attorney General to intervene if he should certify that the
case is of general public importance. 78 Stat. 260, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964).
33. See Hewitt, The Right To Join a Labor Union, 99 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 919-22 (1951)
which indicates that the great majority of arbitrary union exclusions involve racial
discrimination.
34. See, e.g., Strauss & Ingerman, Public Policy and Discrimination in Apprenticeship, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 285, 314 (1965): "[T]here is no reason to believe the federal
law will be any more effective than have been similar state laws. . . . Indeed, since
the federal law contains many procedural barriers to enforcement, we may well expect
it to be less effective." See text accompanying notes 58-59 infra for a discussion of
the procedural advantage of the prima facie tort theory.
35. 78 Stat. 254-55, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-l(e) to (g) (1964).
36. See Strauss & Ingerman, supra note 34, at 304-06.
37. A 1964 study of apprenticeship statistics discloses a tremendous racial imbalance.
The following figures show the percentage of Negro apprentices in some of the larger
industrial areas: California-1.9%; Connecticut-0.5%; Maryland-0.8%; Montgomery
County, Md. (outside Washington, D.C.)-0%; New Jersey-0.5%; New York-2%. In
the cities of Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Newark, and St. Louis there are no Negro ap•
prentices in any of the printing or building trades unions. Id. at 289-91. The 1950
census reveals that in the nation as a whole Negroes comprise only 0.3% of the tool
and die makers, only I% of the electricians, only 2% of the machinists and millwrights,
only 2.4% of the cabinetmakers, and only 3.9% of the carpenters. On the other hand,
the percentage of Negro participation in certain other trades is considerably higher;
cement finishers-26.1 %; brickmasons, stonemasons, and tilesetters-10.9%; paperhangers-II.I%; structural metal workers-7.2%; and roofers and slaters-6.94%.
MARSHALL, THE NEGRO AND ORGANIZED LABOR 110 (1965).
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union membership has come to have in the modem industrial society,
protection against arbitrary exclusion should be given to all workers
and not left to piecemeal legislation. Labor organizations long ago
ceased to bear more than the most superficial resemblance to other
voluntary associations, and presently exert extensive influence over
the lives of millions of workers. Unions are generally in control of
employee grievances "from the shop committee stage, up to arbitration."88 While every labor organization regulated by the NLRA has
a legal duty to represent fairly nonunion members,89 a breach of this
duty is often difficult to prove.40 Thus, the nonmember may not
always receive the protection to which he is entitled. Deprivation of
union membership can also have a substantial defamatory effect: in
many trades social acceptability is directly related to membership in
a labor organization. Yet, while some courts· have recognized this by
awarding damages for loss of reputation due to wrongful suspensions
and expulsions,41 they apparently have never done so in cases of arbitrary exclusion.
The NLRA has magnified the importance of union membership
and has diminished the power of the individual vis-a-vis his employer.
Under section 9(a) of the NLRA,42 a union which is selected by a
majority of the workers in an appropriate bargaining unit becomes
the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees in that
unit. An employee's only weapons for inducing the union to perform
in accordance with his desires are his rights to vote, run for office, and
participate in union meetings.43 Since these weapons are not available
to nonmembers, they are bound by collective bargaining contracts
negotiated by organizations in whose policies they have no voice.
They also run the risk of being discriminated against at the bargaining table. If particular bargaining goals are being urged by non
union members, the union's legal duty of fair representation might be
insufficient to insure that the negotiators, over whose selection the
nonmembers have no control, will pursue those goals in good faith. 44
38. Hewitt, supra note 33, at 924.
39. Steele v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 201-04 (1944).
40. Hewitt, supra note 33, at 923:
Because of the intangibles involved and the difficulty of proving unfair differentiation, the right to a fair representation has not, in its enforcement, always
proved effective in preventing unjust treatment. And if the worker is not a
participant, he may not always know whether he is being fairly represented.
41. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 139 (1950);
Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, 350 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965).
42. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964):
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive bargaining representatives of all the employees in such unit. •••
43. See Hewitt, supra note 33, at 924; Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049, 1056 (1951); Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair
Representation, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1329 (1958).
44. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. See generally Blumrosen, Legal Protection Against Exclusion From Union Activities, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 21 (1961).
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A final weakness in the existing law is that "supervisory" employees and employees who do not qualify under the Commerce
Clause limitation of the NLRB's authority are not covered by the
protective provisions of the NLRA. Nonmembers who fall within
either of these categories may actually be prevented from obtaining
or retaining employment, since in the majority of states without
"right-to-work" laws, labor organizations, when not covered by the
NLRA, remain free to enter into contracts which bind employers to
hire only union members and to enforce such contracts by strikes or
threats to strike.45
Thus the need for greater protection of the individual worker
against unreasonable union admissions policies is apparent. Yet the
three most commonly proposed remedies are unsatisfactory. First, it
has been argued that since unions exercise vast power over the
nation's economy as a direct result of the protection afforded them by
federal legislation, they should be treated as governmental instrumentalities and consequently should be subjected to the constitutional limitations applicable to such instrumentalities. 46 Courts have
found this argument troublesome. The approach might result in
rendering unconstitutional section 102(a)(2) of the LMRDA, which
allows unions to restrict speech and assembly considered detrimental
to the union as an institution.47 Beyond this, there is a rather im45. The position of unions not covered by the NLRA is directly analogous to that
of all labor organizations prior to 1947 when the Taft-Hartley Act added § 8(b)(2)
to the National Labor Relations Act. Thus, pre-1947 decisions are helpful in indicating the extent to which unions, not limited by federal legislation, can affect
the ability of nonmember workers to earn a livelihood in their chosen trade. The
vast majority of these cases held that unions could simultaneously pursue arbitrary
membership policies and enforce closed-shop agreements. See note 22 supra. The
courts of only three states appear to have deviated from this rule: James v. Marinship
Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P .2d 329 (1944); Wilson v. Newspaper &: Mail Deliverers
Union, 123 N.J. Eq. 347, 197 Atl. 720 (1938); Dorrington v. Manning, 135 Pa. Super.
194, 4 A.2d 886 (1939). In each of these cases the union was enjoined from arbitrarily
excluding workers, but was not prohibited from enforcing a union-shop agreement.
This would appear to be the appropriate means for protecting workers since a
judicial refusal to enforce a union-shop agreement would contravene the legislative
policy of those states which have not enacted "right-to-work" laws. It is important
to note, however, that the prima facie tort theory would also accomplish this objective
without vitiating the effect of union-shop agreements.
46. Hewitt, supra note 33, at 939-42. At 942, the author states: "In negotiating a
collective bargaining contract, and otherwise representing the workers, the recognized
union is exercising legislative and governmental power." A similar opinion is expressed in Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049,
1074 (1951): "If unions are recognized as a form of industrial government, then the
rights of a member within a union should be equivalent to the rights of a citizen
within a democratic society." The author of the Note in 58 HARv. L. REv. 448 (1945),
on the other hand, takes a slightly different tack, argning that the certification of
discriminatory unions is unconstitutional.
47. 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 4ll(a)(2) (1964):
Every member of a labor organization shall have the right to • • • express any
views, arguments, or opinions .•. Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an
institution ••••

1682

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 65

precise fear among courts and commentators that treating unions as
instrumentalities of the government will jeopardize union autonomy
by inviting increased governmental regulation of legitimate union
activities. 48 While such fears may be unjustified, only the Supreme
Court of Kansas has accepted the government-instrumentality approach.49 Second, Congress has been urged to enact a law prohibiting
labor organizations from excluding applicants for membership on
any arbitrary or unreasonable grounds. 50 Such legislation could
clearly be effective and would have the additional advantage of
providing a national standard which would be subject to Supreme
Court review. However, since Congress has shown no sign of being
prepared to interfere further in internal union affairs, this approach
does not appear to be a practical alternative. Third, it has been suggested that the NLRB expand its operations into the exclusionexpulsion area. 51 Several cases suggest that the NLRB is willing to
remedy unreasonable expulsions and suspensions in certain particularized circumstances. 62 However, the proviso to section 8(b)(l)(A)
of the NLRA53 is so explicit in its protection of the right of unions
to "prescribe ... [their] own rules with respect to the acquisition
and retention of membership therein . . ." that it seems unlikely
that arbitrary expulsion or exclusion cases can generally be remedied
by the NLRB.
48. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 262 F.2d 359, 363
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1958) (holding that Negro workers have no
constitutional right to admission to membership in a union representing them under
the Railway Labor Act); Cox, supra note 16, at 620:
It has also been argued that the powers which the NLRA vests in labor unions are
so far governmental that all actions, including election and rejection of members,
are subject to the restrictions which the fifth and fourteenth amendments impose
upon the federal and state authorities. . . . In my opinion the reasoning is
highly dangerous. The implications of calling labor unions governmental instru•
mentalities are not easy to perceive but surely the designation would invite more
and more regulation with consequent loss of independence.
49. Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946) (holding that a union which
represented Negro employees under the Railway Labor Act was constitutionally bound
to admit them to membership).
50. Aaron & Kamaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs, 44 ILL. L.
REv. 425, 631 (1949); Cox, supra note 16, at 620-24; Hewitt, supra note 33, at 944-46
(but prefers creation of a common-law "right to union membership''); Summers, The
Right To Join a Union, 47 CoLUM, L. REv. 33, 68-74 (1947) (regards this as the only
practical way to solve the problem in light of the lack of likelihood that the courts
will adopt the constitutional approach).
51. Note, Union Disciplinary Power and Section S(bXZXA) of the National Labor
Relations Act: Limitations on the Immunity Doctrine, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 584 (1966).
52. In Local 138, Int'! Union of Operating Eng'rs (Charles S. Skura), 148 N.L.R.B.
679 (1964) the Board overruled prior authority and held that a union could not fine
a member for having filed unfair practice charges against it. This decision was expanded
into the expulsion area in Cannery Workers, 159 N.L.R.B. No. 47 Qune 21, 1966), where
the Board ruled that a union could not expel a member for filing charges with the
Regional Director. Moreover, in Philadelphia Moving Picture Mach. Operators Union,
159 N.L.R.B. No. 124 Qune 27, 1966), it was held that a member could not be expelled
for inducing a nonmember to charge the union with an unfair labor practice.
53. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1964).
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The prima facie tort doctrine avoids the difficulties inherent in
these approaches and in the traditional common-law property and
contract theories. It affords the worker the broadest possible protection against unreasonable deprivation of membership status, while
not unduly limiting the freedom of labor organizations to pursue
legitimate union interests. Because prima facie tort is wholly a common-law doctrine, 64 the protection it provides is not confined within
the jurisdictional limits that restrict the reach of federal labor legislation and the Civil Rights Act. Yet, unlike the traditional commonlaw theories, 05 the tort principle is applicable in exclusion as well as
expulsion cases. Moreover, the theory recognizes that the worker's
real interest in union membership rests not on semifictional property
and contract rights, 66 but rather on the benefits that he derives from
having a voice in the organization that represents him. Finally, the
prima fade tort doctrine could prove even more effective in cases of
racial discrimination than the remedies provided in the Civil Rights
Act. 67 A party suing under that act has the burden of showing that the
rejection of his membership application was a product of racial
discrimination,ns a difficult task at best. On the other hand, under the
prima facie tort theory, once a worker can show that he was excluded,
the burden of proof shifts to the union to show that the denial of
membership was "justified."
Despite the broad protection the doctrine affords the individual
employee, its use will not prevent unions from imposing reasonable
membership requirements. A fundamental aspect of the prima fade
tort principle is that the defendant will not be held liable if he can
show justification for his action.ri9 Consequently, while the theory will
prevent unions from arbitrarily restricting their membership, it will
not proscribe the good-faith application of reasonable admissions
standards. 00 Occupational skill requirements, nondiscriminatory
quotas, rules barring adherents to "dual unionism," and provisions
for weeding out persons who have clearly manifested subversive
54. Sec note 7 supra.
55. Sec note 22 supra and accompanying text.
56. Sec note 21 supra and accompanying text.
57. Sec notes 29-32 &: 34 supra and accompanying text.
58. The act merely allows the aggrieved party to bring suit in federal court and
docs nothing to relieve the plaintiff of his traditional burden to prove his case. 78
Stat. 260-61, 41 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e) &: (f) (1964).
59. In unfair trade cases, one who puts another out of business will escape liability
if he can prove he was acting in the course of otherwise lawful business competition.
Sec, e.g., Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 151, 119 N.W. 946, 948 (1909). Similarly, in
labor-management relations cases, advancement of worker interests will "justify"
causing injury to an employer through a strike. See, e.g., Opera on Tour, Inc. v. ·weber,
285 N.Y. 348, 360-75, 34 N.E.2d 349, 354-61 (dissenting opinion of Justice Lehman),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 615 (1941).
60. In Hurwitz the court suggested that a union may lawfully restrict its membership if the restriction is "necessary for the union's welfare and [is] ••• invoked in good
faith and without malice." Principal case at 74.
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tendencies all might still legally be imposed. Thus, there is no danger
that the application of prima facie tort to prevent arbitrary union
exclusions will conflict with the provisions of the NLRA61 and the
LMRDA62 which are designed to permit labor organizations to
protect themselves against infiltration by persons whose membership
would be detrimental to the union as an institution. 63 Moreover,
unlike the treatment of unions as governmental instrumentalities, the
use of the doctrine will not jeopardize union autonomy. 64
A significant practical advantage of the prima facie tort theory is
that there are no obstacles preventing the courts from immediately
applying it to union exclusions. As noted earlier, 65 many states long
ago adopted the doctrine into their common law. While none has
expanded its application to cover internal union affairs, the principal
case indicates the facility with which this may be done. Nor is there a
problem of federal pre-emption: the Supreme Court has held that
union expulsions are primarily a matter of state law, 66 the LMRDA
expressly leaves undiminished the power of the states to regulate
internal union affairs, 67 and the Civil Rights Act specifically makes
provision for resort to state procedures.68

Conclusion
The growth of the influence of labor organizations has brought
with it an increase in the value of union membership. As a result,
deprivation of union membership has come to have a more significant
effect upon the person so deprived. If the union action causing this
hardship is unjustifiable, the injured worker should be afforded legal
protection. The most logical, effective, and practicable means of
granting this protection is through the application of the prima facie
tort doctrine.
61. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1964), quoted in note 23 supra.
62. 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 4ll(a)(2) (1964), quoted in note 47 supra.
63. The language of the LMRDA is expressly limited to such situations. 73 Stat.
522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 4ll(a)(2) (1964), quoted in note 47 supra. Although the NLRA
provision is broader [61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1964), quoted in
note 23 supra], it has been applied primarily to cases where expulsion was justified
in order to preserve the union's very existence. See, e.g., Tawas Tube Prods., Inc.,
151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965) (expulsion of members for filing decertification petition is
within proviso to § S(b)(l)(A)).
64. For example, the doctrine could have no restrictive force in the area of labor•
management relations where the common law is pre-empted by federal legislation.
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (holding that the
state and federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the NLRB when•
ever the activity which is the subject matter of the litigation is arguably either prohibited by § 8 or protected by § 7 of the NLRA).
65. See note 7 supra.
66. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
67. 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1964).
68. 78 Stat. 259-60, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b) 8: (c) (1964).

